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ABSTRACT: The main purpose of this article is to analyze the possibility of implementing finan-
cial practices that, in the principles that guide them, are different from and question the func-
tioning of most banks in capitalist societies. In particular, the article describes the ways in which 
credit relationships (i.e. relationships between credit institutions and their borrowers) are con-
ceived and shaped by some “alternative” banks and financial cooperatives. The findings are 
based on ethnographic fieldwork, including observations and in-depth interviews, focused on 
three financial organizations: Banca Etica (Italy), MAG6 (Italy), and La Nef (France). While striv-
ing to establish “another kind of finance”, different from the capitalistic, speculative form, these 
banks and financial cooperatives aim to create more cooperative and solidarity-based credit  
relationships. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In sociology, interest in the study of financial practices is growing. In particular, cur-
rent works focus on the functioning of financial markets, on one hand, and on institu-
tions and credit relationships, on the other. This article pertains to the latter. It has of-
ten been observed that, from the etymological point of view, credit refers to the trust 
between lenders and debtors: the relationship between these two types of actors, as 
well as the role played by the institutions framing and supervising this particular rela-
tionship, are analyzed by the sociology of credit.  
It is now widely acknowledged that economic tools cause moral and symbolic ef-
fects, while moral categories produce economic outcomes (Fourcade and Woll 2014, 
3). Indeed,  
“economic transactions and interactions are a powerful vehicle for the crystallization of 
moral categories precisely because they are a key mechanism through which individu-
als and human collectives obtain or are recognized in positions within the social struc-
ture” (Fourcade 2014, 22). This is particularly relevant with respect to the credit/debt 
couple, which immediately establishes asymmetrical relationships among social actors, 
making it possible to draw distinctions between them according to their positions in 
relation to these two polarities. 
Despite the spread of credit scoring – i.e., credit risk statistical analysis (Poon, 2009) 
– several authors (Ferrary 2002, 2003; Lazarus 2012; Moiso 2011), have shown the so-
cial embeddedness of contemporary credit, highlighting the role social networks play in 
loan granting. Concerning the different methods for calculating credit risk, some works 
underlined the difference between large commercial banks and banking institutions 
more rooted in the social webs their borrowers belong to (Ferrary 2002, 2003; Moiso 
2011). These studies emphasize the importance, from the bankers’ perspective, of ac-
cessing some information that may be collected through shared social environments. 
For example, the possibility for evaluating the personal and social qualities of loan de-
manders helps to reduce credit risk, particularly in the case of small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
Other approaches of the sociology of credit focus instead on the “domination  
relationship” that would bind borrowers and lenders (Bourdieu, P., Boltanski, L. and  
Chamboredon 1963, Bourdieu 2000). Some authors refer to the asymmetry of exper-
tise on how  credit functions, while underlining the fact that the kind of assessment 
methods used by most banks exclude part of the population from banking services 
(Gloukoviezoff 2004). Moreover, the forms in which bank credit is distributed increases 
social and economic inequalities because  borrowers who do not meet a bank's stand-
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ards need to provide further information and  justification in order to obtain the trust 
of the bank advisor, and therefore pass the “credit test” (Lazarus 2009). Thus, individu-
als are evaluated on the basis of their calculation and budget management skills, as 
well as with respect to their ability to anticipate both their economic needs and re-
sources. From this point of view, family socialization that adapts to any form of eco-
nomic rationality that differs from those adopted by banks can be crippling for the  
customer. Favored borrowers are, in contrast, those endowed with cognitive and cul-
tural resources to master the specific language and calculation modes that are valued 
by banks (Perrin-Heredia, 2009). 
The transformation of the role, tasks and organization of banking professionals have 
been another focus of sociological research. Some studies highlighted banks’ develop-
ments toward a more commercial orientation. Indeed, banks are now considered pure-
ly “business organizations” for many legislation systems, including the Italian and 
French ones (Palmisano 2006 and Lazarus 2012). This article relates mostly to those 
works pointing out the plurality of normative references in the banking sector (Lazarus 
2012; Moiso 2011). For instance, beginning with the theoretical framework of Boltanski 
and Thévenot (1991), André Wissler (1989) showed the existence of several logics of 
action within the Crédit Mutuel of Brittany. In fact, credit  business is shaped not only 
by criteria such as risk reduction and profit maximization, but also by moral criteria re-
ferring to borrowers’ behavior towards their family and community. 
Most banks are now conceiving credit relations as assets that can be sold and 
bought on financial markets. This is possible thanks to “securitization”, which consists 
of either “selling on a secondary market securities issued on a primary market (e.g. 
Treasury bonds) or transforming bank’s loans, including mortgages, into securities 
which can be traded on markets” (Chesnais 2011: 142). For major capitalist financial 
conglomerates, securitization marked, in the Nineties, the transition from the “origi-
nate to hold” (OTH) model to the “originate to distribute” (OTD) model. The latter al-
lows the sale of both loans and associated risks to others financial actors. Therefore, 
claims investors can make on debtors’ future income “(which take the form of compa-
ny shares, governments bonds, etc.) and their derivatives are marketed and traded on 
financial markets – with the help of financial intermediaries […]. The existence of such 
markets allows participants to sell claims and risks they no longer want, and to pursue 
additional profits through clever trading” (Knorr Cetina and Preda 2005, 1).  
This “liquefaction” of credit relationships, as well as the “depoliticization” of finan-
cial risks through the propagation of mathematical modeling in finance (de Goede 
2004), is precisely one of the elements that some “alternative” banks challenge to the 
capitalist finance model. This article will focus on the credit practices I observed in 
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three banking organizations in particular (Banca Etica and MAG16 in Italy, La Nef2 in 
France) which aim to 1) place the creditor-debtor relationship at the center of their 
business (avoiding having to treat it as a security which can be traded), and 2) trans-
forming this relationship into one of more cooperation and solidarity. While the first is 
common to other small, local banks as well, the second refers to a “political” program, 
dedicated to the transformation of social reality – an aspect specific to alternative fi-
nance organizations.  
Concerning the expression “alternative finance”, it is worth pointing out that it is al-
so defined as “ethical” (Banca Etica), “critical” (MAG6), or “solidarity-based” (La Nef), 
which can all be considered part of what Laville and Cattani (2006) call “solidarity eco-
nomics.” This term  refers to organizations of producers, consumers, and savers, 
“which value the notion of  solidarity, as opposed to that of competitive individualism, 
which characterizes the dominant economic behavior in capitalist societies” (Laville 
and Cattani 2006, 290). The choice of such  organizations as Banca Etica, MAG6, and La 
Nef is justified primarily by four criteria: 1) they fulfill the basic functions of banks, 
namely the collecting of savings and loan granting; 2) they are heterogeneous in terms 
of legal form (both banks, such as Banca Etica, and organizations that have not ob-
tained the agreement for taking the legal form of bank, such as MAG6 and La Nef3) and 
size (on the one hand, small, locally oriented actors, such as MAG64; on the other hand, 
larger organizations spread throughout the national territory, such as Banca Etica5 and 
La Nef6); 3) they implement the main principles of solidarity or ethical finance, namely  
transparency concerning the final destination of the money collected (in terms of capi-
tal, savings deposits, etc.) and loan-granting procedures that embrace both economic 
and social/environmental criteria; and 4) they are all cooperatives. Concerning the 
kinds of actors who can be funded by Banca Etica, MAG6, and La Nef, it is worth point-
ing out that they include in their activities both professional and private loans: never-
theless, in this article, I will focus on professional loans only. 
 
1
 Acronym for: Mutua Auto Gestione. 
2
 Acronym for: Nouvelle Economie Fraternelle. 
3
 La Nef has now obtained a new agreement that allows it to fulfill the functions of “établissement de 
crédit specialisé”, a legal form close to bank. The transition, however, remains under way: 
http://www.lanef.com/lanefenaction/actu_relances.php?id=188 (revised October, 16, 2014). 
4
 MAG6 has 1393 members; 7 employees; 2.4 M€ of social capital and 2.3 M € of current credits (data at 
31/12/2013). 
5
 Banca Etica has 37 264 members; 235 employees; 48.3 M€ of social capital; 924.8 M€ of money collected 
and 777,5 M € of current credits (data at 31/12/2013).  
6
 La Nef counts 33 466 members; 64 employees; 31.8 M € of social capital; 307 M€ of money collected and 
108 M€ of current credits (data at 31/12/2013). 
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Using ethnographic techniques, I was able to observe the daily work of employees 
at Banca Etica, MAG6, and La Nef. In particular, I attended weekly staff meetings, as 
well as  meetings between project leaders, borrowers, clients, and meetings involving 
managers, employees, and volunteer members of the bank or financial cooperative. In 
order to better understand their loan-granting procedures, I also did a six-month in-
ternship at La Nef; afterwards, I was hired as a short-term employee for three months. 
The data I could collect include my field notes, annual reports, the websites of these 
banks and financial companies, as well as written communication between the actors 
involved in these organizations, specifically emails and newsletters. Moreover, I con-
ducted 49 in-depth interviews with employees, borrowers, and voluntary members of 
Banca Etica, MAG6, and La Nef. 
The main purpose of the article is to analyze the possibility of implementing finan-
cial practices, which in the principles that guide them are different from and question 
the functioning of most banks in capitalist societies. So I “bet” (Ogien 2011, 119) that 
the analysis of certain aspects of MAG6, Banca Etica and La Nef’s credit activity may al-
low a further understanding of how anti-capitalist critique can be accomplished in con-
crete situations. In particular, I will describe the ways in which credit relationships (i.e. 
relationships between credit institutions and their borrowers) are conceived and 
shaped within the alternative finance sector. 
 
 
2. MAG6, Banca Etica and La Nef 
 
Concerning the history of the aforementioned organizations, it should be noted that 
the first MAG was born in 1978 in Verona, as a Società di Mutuo Soccorso. The first 
loans were granted to a group of workers who aimed to self-manage their factory, 
which had been closed, as well as toward the creation of a farm to hire fired workers. 
MAG Verona then founded a cooperative called MAG-FIN upon the idea that the legal 
form of a cooperative could better meet the financial needs of its territory of reference 
(Prette 2001: 11).  
In the 1980s, similar initiatives to that of MAG Verona emerged in many parts of  
northern Italy, all taking the legal form of cooperatives: MAG2 in Milan, MAG3 in Pad-
ua, MAG4 in Turin, AUTOGEST in Udine, MAG6 in Reggio Emilia, CTM-MAG based in 
Bolzano but especially active in Padua, MAG7 in Genoa, MAG Venice. Some of these 
MAG today have stopped working, having integrated Banca Etica after the birth of the 
latter in 1999 (as is the case for MAG3 and CTM-MAG), or having considered that their 
actions were no longer necessary following the birth of an ethical bank in Italy (as AU-
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TOGEST did). In September 2013, a new MAG in Florence was allowed to enroll in the 
list of authorized financial intermediaries. From a legal point of view, the MAG are now 
“Solidarity and Mutualistic Finance Organizations”, subject to Article 111 of Legislative 
Decree 1 September 1993/385 which governs the micro-credit7. Each MAG “may be 
considered a single case, different with respect to any other”, because of their strong 
local roots; nevertheless, there are fundamental common traits among them. In partic-
ular, MAGs aim to “the creation of economic models […] based on co-operation, self-
management and on grassroots associationism” (Burlando 2001: 16). 
The history of Banca Etica is closely connected to that of MAG in general, and to 
MAG3’s history in particular. According to Milano (2001) – cultural relations manager 
for Banca Etica – the foundation of Banca Etica was aimed “to prevent the financial-
social experience accumulated in so many years [through MAG activity] to be dis-
persed”, a reference to the reorganization of MAG cooperatives that resulted from im-
portant changes in the Italian banking legislation in the Nineties8. Therefore, 21 among 
the main non-profit and volunteer Italian organizations (including ACLI, Arci, Agesci, FI-
BA CISL, Gruppo Abele, Emmaus […]) thought to found a new bank that continues fully, 
and everywhere in Italy, on this path” (Milano 2001, 101). 
This assertion, however, does not seem to take into account the banking activity 
other MAG (including MAG6) continued to carry out even after the birth of Banca Etica. 
Indeed, the fact of interpreting the constitution of Banca Etica as the crowning of the 
MAG movement was one of the factors that led to tensions between some MAG and 
the bank. Nevertheless, it is true that the new regulatory framework imposed more 
constraints on MAG’s financial activity (Burlando 2001). Therefore, the establishment 
of an institution such as Banca Etica could guarantee more flexibility both on the col-
lecting and loan-granting sides9, which was an important aspect even for MAG net-
work. 
 
7
 Within this legislative framework, MAG are defined as “Mutualistic and solidarity finance organizations” 
– this definition results as a specific category. In particular, some exemptions are allowed to MAG that are 
not allowed to micro-credit institutions according to the rules applying to them. Indeed, “mutualistic  
solidarity finance organizations” can grant loans up to € 75 000 for a 10-year maximum. These norms, 
however, are very recent (October 17, 2014). Before, MAG were defined as financial intermediaries  
subject to the legislative framework resulting from the Decrees 143 and 197 (anti-money laundering laws, 
introduced in 1991).  
8
 The reform of the TUB (Testo Unico Bancario – the legislative framework regulating the banking sector) 
was introduced in 1993 and entered into force beginning 1
st
 January 1994. 
9
 The new TUB (Testo Unico Bancario) allowed banks only to collect individuals’ savings (Prette 2001: 13). 
Money that MAG6 collects and then lends is not “saving” in the strictest sense of the word, but shares of 
social capital. 
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Concerning La Nef’s history, it should be highlighted that this financial cooperative 
called “New Fraternal Economy” (Nouvelle Economie Fraternelle) is described on its 
own website as “a cooperative of solidarity finance.” It is also pointed out that La Nef’s 
mission consists in “giving meaning to money”, by using it to support projects involving 
a positive impact for the local community. This seems to refer to the possibility of dis-
tinguishing between two “qualities” of money, according to its final destination: money 
that can be positively “marked” (Zelizer 1994) thanks to its impact on the collectivity; 
and money that has to be negatively marked, as its main purpose is generating more 
money while ignoring the social and environmental dimensions of economic activities 
(Zelizer 2005; de Blic and Lazarus 2007). La Nef’s institutional discourse currently fo-
cuses on the importance of funding activities with high social, cultural and/or environ-
mental “added value”. Instead, in its origins La Nef aimed at lending money to alterna-
tive and innovative projects that could not get loans from the traditional banking sys-
tem. Indeed, Jean-Pierre Bideau – former teacher in a Steiner School and co-founder of 
La Nef – noted in an interview that, when seeking funding to open a school  
inspired by Waldorf education, he was soon confronted with financial issues: “The 
banks would not lend us money because we had no capital; especially for a project like 
ours, which was considered as strange” (Calmé 2012, 31-32). Thanks to the German 
bank GLS, Jean-Pierre Bideau realized it was possible to “address the issue of financing 
in a different way” (Calmé 2012, 32). In 1979 he thus gave birth to the Association10 La 
Nef, together with Henry Nouyrit, father of former pupils of the Steiner school where 
Bideau taught. 
  
 
3. Alternative credit relationships  
 
Concerning the question of whether credit activity—in particular credit relation-
ships—can be given positive meaning, it should be noted that Banca Etica, MAG6, and 
La Nef explicitly declare (namely, in their statutes and public documents) to aim to turn 
the relationship between creditors and debtors into a cooperative and solidarity-based 
link. In this process, the first step consists in acknowledging that credit contracts gen-
erate a relationship among social actors, which cannot be completely dissolved and 
treated as a commodity to sell or buy on the financial markets, while targeting profit 
maximization in the short run (Amato and Fantacci 2012). 
 
10
 From 1979 La Nef had the legal form of association, while from 1984, after the introduction of a new 
banking law, it was compelled to assume a cooperative status: in 1988, the financial cooperative was 
founded. 
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Thus, I will focus on the relationship between banking institutions and borrowers: do 
Banca Etica, MAG6, and La Nef succeed in shaping it in a cooperative and solidarity-
based way, while differentiating their activities from that of capitalist banks? First, it 
should be noted that these organizations commit themselves to finance “real econo-
my”, banning speculative operations11. Moreover, they screen loans’ demands not only 
on the basis of the amount requested and the demander’s financial situation, but also 
taking into account the “ethical” dimension of loan’s final destination. They thus check 
whether the way debtors intend to use the borrowed money is consistent with the or-
ganization’s solidarity principles. The importance of the “final use” in order for a credit 
to be considered as “solidarity” or “ethical” is linked to the transparency policy MAG6, 
Banca Etica and La Nef put in place. While in capitalist banks lenders cannot know the 
final destination of their money, alternative finance organizations disclose information 
on how the money collected is used. Through this transparency engagement, they also 
strive to make savers aware of their (indirect) responsibility for the consequences pro-
duced by the way banks use the money they choose to deposit there, in exchange for 
an interest rate.  
In the alternative finance sector, the setting of interest rates is mostly based on  
cost-recovery perspective – the aim of MAG6,Banca Etica and La Nef doesn’t consist in 
profit maximization, but in financial stability. Since these organizations do not derive 
their incomes from speculative operations carried out in financial markets12, they are 
forced to maintain a stable spread between active and passive interest rates to ensure 
the economic stability of their structure. This policy concerning interest rates implies 
great exposure to market fluctuations, making these banks and financial cooperatives 
less competitive in a global context of low interest rates.  
Concerning credit relationships, it is worth pointing out that for MAG6, Banca Etica 
and La Nef, the relationship with borrowers is crucial from the initial step of loan appli-
cation assessments, and credit contracts are regarded as relationships with people, not 
as a means to produce assets that can then be sold on financial markets. Alternative 
 
11
 This aim of banning speculative transactions is completely reached only by MAG6. In contrast, Banca 
Etica founded an Investment Management Company (“Etica SGR”) which operates on financial markets, 
even though on the basis of environmental, social and governance criteria. With regard to La Nef, this  
latter does not use, at the moment, all the money collected to loan granting. Although its ambition is to 
increase its credit activity, according to its 2013 annual report, loans granted amounted to €108 million, 
while bank deposits reached €444 million. Since money not lent is deposited in institutions such as Crédit 
Coopératif or Caisse d’Épargne Rhône-Alpes, which do not engage in disclosing transparent information 
concerning the use they make of their financial resources, La Nef is unable to ensure complete traceability 
of the money collected. 
12
 This is only partially true for Banca Etica and, especially, La Nef’s case (see note 11). 
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finance organizations thus work according to the principle “originate to hold” (OTH), 
implying that credit institutions take on the risks related to the loans granted.  
MAG6, Banca Etica, and La Nef also aim to transform relationships with their  
borrowers in a more cooperative way. The emphasis on the importance of human rela-
tions is synthesized by mottos such as: “To let money bring people together”13 (La Nef), 
“Money as if people counted for something”14 (MAG6), and “The highest interest is 
that of everybody”15 (Banca Etica). These mottos summarize the social change these 
organizations aim to contribute to, which consists in building more cohesive relation-
ships between people. For instance, regarding loan applications, MAG6, Banca Etica 
and La Nef take into account both financial and “ethical” criteria, such as social and en-
vironmental impacts as well as working conditions. Moreover, a meeting with project 
leaders is always included in loan-granting procedures: employees go visit the local ar-
ea in which the project is or will be carried out16. 
The importance given to the relational dimension also leads to some “failed” credi-
tor/debtor relationships, namely practices relating to the refusal of loan demands. In 
fact, according to these organizations’ perspective, choosing not to fund a personal or 
professional project might be consistent with their values, namely based on the princi-
ple of the creditor’s co-responsibility for the debtor’s failure. For instance, if a loan 
demander is already over-indebted, refusing to grant a new loan would be fair. As 
Streeck (2013) notes, “similar principles may be invoked if a barman keeps serving 
double whiskies to a customer who is already drunk, and then lets him drive home in 
his car” (Streeck 2013, 616). Likewise, refusing the loan demands that imply negative 
environmental or social externalities embodies the principle of building “another kind 
of finance.”  
However, for a denial of a loan application to be considered “ethical”, it is not suffi-
cient that it aims at protecting the bank or financial cooperative from potential loan 
defaults, or at preventing project leaders to become over-indebted; nor at ensuring a 
loans’ consistency with the kind of activities deemed eligible by the creditor organiza-
tion. The ethical dimension can also be expressed in the way that refusals are prepared 
and communicated. Indeed, the ethical approach also encompasses the fact of making 
loan demanders understand the reasons of the refusal. This is meant to avoid, as much 
as possible, project leaders feeling misjudged. Furthermore, concerning the case of La 
Nef, I learned during my internship that if the project seems to have concrete im-
 
13 
In French: “Pour que l’argent relie les hommes”. 
14
 In Italian: “Il denaro come se la gente contasse qualcosa”. 
15
 In Italian: “L’interesse più alto è quello di tutti”. 
16
 Here I refer to professional loans in particular. 
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provement tracks, employees encourage loan applicants to contact other organizations 
(such as CIGALES17 or Garrigue18) that may help them increase the level of equity or 
ameliorate their business plan. Therefore, the ambition to build more cooperative and 
solidarity-based credit relationships is reflected in the practice of explaining the rea-
sons for a refusal, while other banks may simply not answer at all – according to the 
experiences of some La Nef borrowers, related during both my internship and inter-
views.  
Once the credit relationship is built and the loan allocated, the borrowers who do 
not encounter any particular problems in loan repayment are able to experience a ra-
ther symmetrical relationship with their creditor institute. Indeed, the interests that 
borrowers pay are essential to the financial stability of the organization. Moreover, set-
ting up projects with a positive impact from the cultural, social or environmental point 
of view is precisely what gives “meaning” to the money collected. Borrowers return the 
money received to their local communities through initiatives that will benefit not only 
those directly involved, but also a much larger number of actors, including people 
working in or voluntarily involved in the creditor institute. Such remarks apply to the 
environmental sector in particular, the positive consequences of initiatives in such a 
domain affecting the whole population of the planet. 
More equal creditor/debtor relationships can be developed in the alternative finan-
cial field through mutual judgments that both financial organizations and their borrow-
ers pass on one another. The first assesses loan demands and monitors funded pro-
jects, while the second  evaluates the services provided by the creditor cooperative, 
also against their own ethical principles. For example, a Banca Etica borrower inter-
viewed during my fieldwork complained about experiencing some delay in receiving 
her loan, stating: “the effectiveness sometimes becomes an issue... also an important 
issue. There is ethics even in responding in adequate time to people’s demands”19. Af-
terwards, she added: 
 
 
17 “
Clubs d’Investisseurs pour une Gestion Alternative et Locale de l’Epargne Solidaire” (CIGALES) are a 
network of groups of investors who decide to use their savings to buy capital shares of small-medium size 
companies which are often selected within their local area: http://www.cigales.asso.fr/spip.php?rubrique6 
(revised July, 15, 2014). 
18 
Garrigue is a company of “venture solidarity capital” that financially supports companies in their start-up 
or development phases. Funded companies must “put human and environmental issues at the heart of 
their concerns”: http://www.garrigue.net/ (revised December, 29, 2014). 
19
 For instance, the Statute of Banca Etica (art. 5) declares: “efficiency and simplicity are ethical  
responsibility’s components”: http://www.bancaetica.it/chi-siamo/profilo-istituzionale/statuto (revised 
October, 15, 2014). 
Arianna Lovera, Debts, differently 
 
595 
 
I’m proud to say I am funded by Banca Etica. It's also a way to show that there is 
someone else who supports our project. […] Sometimes it's hard to discuss about every-
thing  with everybody: why there are some products
20
 here, why I work in a certain way 
with my employees […]. Relying on Banca Etica means that these things have already 
been discussed. 
But this presupposes that people do trust Banca Etica’s assessment, which would thus  
function as a kind of label, like the organic label... 
Yes, I usually... from what I hear, people trust Banca Etica. It's like an additional label 
[smile]... Yes, I agree [Banca Etica borrower, interview n. 14]. 
 
In alternative finance, credit relationships arise from a double selection process not 
only driven by economic reasons: the first step refers to a project leaders’ choice to 
appeal to an ethical bank – the “elective” dimension is especially obvious when they 
could have obtained the loan from other banking institutions. The second step is relat-
ed to the credit organization’s decision to finance that particular project instead of 
others. With this choice, project leaders and alternative finance organizations recog-
nize and confirm one another as actors playing in the same “political alternative” situa-
tion. Within this frame, actions are oriented towards social change – that is, towards 
the construction of a more cooperative and inclusive social model. Because MAG6, 
Banca Etica, and La Nef fund “meaningful” projects, the money they manage acquires 
“meaning” as well; similarly, as project leaders borrow from an alternative financial or-
ganization which analyzes loan demands on the basis of both socio-environmental and  
financial criteria, they get an additional “certification” concerning the ethical orienta-
tions of their business activity. 
After highlighting that the ethical dimension is also reflected in certain efficiency in 
terms of deadlines21, it should also be mentioned that this aspect can result in borrow-
ers’ supporting, especially when they encounter difficulties in loan repayment, as illus-
trated by these interview extracts: 
 
 
20
 Organic products. 
21
 Banca Etica, MAG6, and La Nef’s employees are well aware of this point. Moreover, it should be noted 
that, during the above quoted interview, the Banca Etica borrower stressed that she trusted Banca Etica, 
believing that delays in her loan were not due to “dishonesty:” “Certainly what is said about banks... you 
can speak with any customer, and certainly he will complain of some unfairness, dishonesty, or at least 
ambiguity. Concerning Banca Etica I have never heard anything like that. In fact, I don’t think they were  
delaying my loan on purpose... I think it was a problem of disorganization or not organization, and that can 
have consequences... that's why I consider it serious, but not because they would have done it on  
purpose”. 
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They came to meet me, we had a discussion, we talked about the project, and right 
away they were very open and already with a supporting approach to my project and to 
all ideas that could help carry out my project. And I really felt a kind of support that was 
really, well, very special compared to other banks [...]. You know that if you have a prob-
lem, well, you can go to La Nef and see, well, see your project... and... well, you know 
you're not alone, and that's really important. You know that if you suffer a setback, if our 
business does not work... hem... you... you can go and ask them, see, analyze to... well, 
to know what to do... what you can do, if you can be supported, not supported, if you 
move in the right direction... […]. You really feel a sort of, may I say, really... “family”, 
huh, so to speak, that... you know you have that shoulder, you don’t start... you don’t 
take a leap in the dark like that [La Nef, borrower, interview n. 16]. 
 
So this experience as funded members
22
... 
It’s now concluded. 
Well, but you think you’ll go back to MAG6, if you need a loan? 
I hope, I’d like to think I don’t need it, but we would have it as a reference, that's for 
sure. 
So, let's say, it's been a positive experience... 
Yes, positive because money is always in the middle, it's always “You owe me”, “You 
must be on time”, etc. but it's a human thing, it's not like banks. I’m terrified of banks. 
In what sense is it “a human thing”? 
Well, the relationships are humane! Even if we talk about money, we talk about it in a  
different way... it didn’t happen to me, it happened to another person who had prob-
lems: due dates of payment were agreed upon without the massacre that banks usually 
make. 
So, say, the main difference lies in this aspect... 
Yes, there is a kind of agreeing, there is a kind of listening to your problem, your appli-
cation, and you, the debtor, you listen to their proposal... yes, it's not: “Since it's MAG, I 
don’t pay”, even though I know they had problems, from people who walked out on 
them [MAG6 borrower, interview n. 17]. 
 
This “human dimension” – paying attention to people beyond their applications and  
repayment plans – is not a distinctive feature of alternative finance organizations. “Re-
lationship banking” is a well-known concept that can also be a strategic choice: a rela-
tionship bank may be perceived as more client-oriented and unique relative to its com-
petitors (Boot 2000). Among the potential benefits of relationship banking, Boot (2000) 
 
22
 In MAG6, Banca Etica, and La Nef all borrowers must buy some shares of social capital, becoming thus 
members of these cooperatives. In the case of MAG6, they are also called “funded members” rather than 
“borrowers.” 
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also mentions the fact that “with relationship banking, a borrower might be inclined to 
reveal more information than in transaction-oriented interaction” (Boot 2000: 12). 
Moreover, as Cornée and Szafarz (2014) showed through a model built on the case of 
La Nef, “social or ethical banks” (i.e. banks that are not only relationship-oriented but 
which also pay attention to the non-economic consequences of their activity) can gen-
erally count on better repayment performances than standard banks. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that “moral values shared by the bank and its motivated  
borrowers lead to a two-step virtuous mechanism. In the first place, the social bank 
proposes advantageous credit terms to its motivated borrowers. Then, these borrow-
ers respond by defaulting less frequently than their standard counterparts” (Cornée 
and Szafarz 2014, 361). The fact that ethical banks would charge lower interest rates 
on borrowers remains questionable: as already mentioned, MAG6, Banca Etica and La 
Nef need to maintain a stable spread between passive and active interest rates for 
cost-recovery reasons. Therefore, when interest rates are generally very low, they 
might become less competitive compared to standard banks.  
According to Cornée and Szafarz (2014), alternative finance organizations would 
benefit from less defaults, a fact that might be linked to the aforementioned “humane” 
approach towards repayment difficulties as well. However, the relationship orientation 
of alternative credit activity can also cause severe disappointment when these organi-
zations must use the same tools that conventional banks use, especially when facing 
recovery problems. For example, a volunteer member of Banca Etica mentioned in an 
interview the case of a borrower whose loan was ranked as “irrecoverable”, a proce-
dure implying that the loan would count as one of the institute’s losses and, above all, 
that borrower would be reported to the “Centrale Rischi Banca d'Italia.” This action has 
very serious consequences for the debtor because, if he has taken out loans with other 
banks, the latter will ask him to repay them. 
According to the interviewee: 
 
There was an overdraft of several thousand euros, an overdraft that wasn’t subsid-
ing... only, instead of calling her
23
 or letting GIT
24
 know... she received a letter saying 
they
25
 were about to rank her debt as irrecoverable... GIT felt superseded. […] Probably 
what happened was that there was an excess of zeal, since they put her among the irre-
 
23
 Namely, the borrower. I use the feminine gender to refer to all social actors involved in my research in 
order to better protect their anonymity. 
24
 Acronym for “Gruppo di Iniziativa Territoriale” (Group of Territorial Initiative), local group of volunteer 
members of Banca Etica, committed to spread the values of ethical finance in their local areas. Today, the 
GIT consists of 68 all over Italy.  
25
 Banca Etica’s employees. 
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coverable debts, without realizing that maybe she was in a special situation that could be 
solved in another way. [ ... ] I see two sides to this story: on the one hand, the negative 
side, since even with a bank like Banca Etica, which should really put relationships with 
people at the center, such situations can happen, in which no attention is paid to peo-
ple... and I don’t know if it's because the organization is very big compared to a small co-
operative such as MAG, for example... the positive side, however, is that, compared to 
other banks in which, when someone’s debt is ranked as “irrecoverable”, the debtor has 
to fight alone, here active members
26
 got involved and became aware of the situation... 
and it shows that it is a bank where members can actively participate, where they are lis-
tened to and taken into consideration... unlike what happens in other cooperatives, in 
which members are only invited once a year to the [general] assembly [Banca Etica and 
MAG6 member, interview n. 15]. 
 
Sometimes, alternative finance organizations adopt certain patterns of action that 
standard capitalist banks also use, not only out of an excess of zeal but because other 
possible ways to deal with recovery problems (namely the renegotiation of both the 
monthly due amount and the duration of the loan) may not be viable. For example, I 
once attended a meeting of MAG6 employees and managers in which they were dis-
cussing a problem related to some borrowers who had difficulties in repaying the loan, 
yet refused to interact with MAG. In particular, the borrowers did not respond to calls 
and emails from MAG6 employees. Marta and Alice27 were in charge of this loan: Mar-
ta was inclined toward a relational approach and therefore was still looking for a con-
tact with the borrowers; Alice, instead, assumed that any relationship with them was, 
at that moment, impossible and insisted on sending a promissory note. In the  
meeting during which this case was discussed, Marta admitted that the “tough” atti-
tude proposed by Alice – of course not as the first solution, but only after a number of 
failed attempts at contacting the borrowers – had performed better than her more re-
lational approach, as the bill was eventually paid. During the same meeting, another 
worker, Giulia, specified that the following month she would have sent a new promis-
sory note, as they could not wait for the borrowers to pay “spontaneously.”  
Alice also showed some resentment towards those borrowers, who “surprisingly” 
began to repay their loan only when MAG shows its toughest side, concluding that, 
“obviously, before [switching to the tough approach] they gave priority to other credi-
tors”. However, Caterina did not agree with this point of view: “Yes, well, at least they 
are not rolling in money! They are objectively in trouble!”. Marta and another MAG6 
manager shared this opinion, underlining that, of course debts should be paid, but at 
 
26
 Namely volunteers committed to the GIT. 
27
 Of course, all social actors’ names used in this article are aliases. 
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the same time one should remember that if the borrowers did not pay, it was primarily 
because of their financial situation and not because they did not want to. In particular, 
a MAG6 manager stressed, “the system forces you to do nasty things, such as sending 
promissory notes, but [carrying out such practices] is not the reason why we gave birth 
to our cooperative.” 
Even when the tools used by MAG6, Banca Etica, or La Nef do not differ from those 
of conventional banks, some “alternative” dimension remains present. The above-
mentioned discussions make explicit the different, and sometimes contradictory, con-
straints related to experimenting an alternative to the capitalist financial system. While 
aiming for social transformation by establishing practices different from the ones wide-
spread in “conventional” banks, MAG6, Banca Etica, and La Nef can nonetheless find 
themselves forced to adopt some practices that contradict their solidarity principles. In 
fact, they must also take into account the organization’s profitability and financial sta-
bility. Neglecting this aspect would not be a wise choice because it would be detri-
mental to all actors concerned (employees, savers, borrowers, and the cooperative’s 
members). We can therefore affirm that, even when actions undertaken by alternative 
finance organizations do not differ from those of conventional banks, MAG6, Banca Eti-
ca, and La Nef still place themselves within a political alternative framework, if actors 
involved in such situations highlight the contradiction between certain practices and 
their organizations’ specific principles and goals. 
Sometimes, banking tools can be used differently from capitalist banks. This is, for 
example, the case of a La Nef borrower, who faced liquidation. She had maintained a 
trustful relationship with Jeanne, the employee responsible for her case. During my in-
ternship, I listened to a very cordial telephone conversation between the two, in which 
Jeanne asked the borrower if she thought her stocks could be sold, and how much it 
would be possible to obtain, while stressing that: 
 
Well, actually... Even if, after the sale of your stock, part of the loan still remains to be 
repaid back, we will actually use the guarantees we took, so in this case your and your 
husband’s personal guarantees... knowing that in theory guarantees are immediately 
due, but we can now agree on the basis of your availabilities… and especially of your 
possibilities... knowing that we cannot, however, plan deadlines as we can for a loan... 
we cannot collect the amount corresponding to your guarantees for like three years. 
 
Thus, the asymmetry characterizing creditor/debtor relationships does not seem to 
be canceled in alternative finance: borrowers are required to repay the loan or, if not, 
guarantors must honor their commitments. Nevertheless, debtors’ needs and econom-
ic possibilities are also taken into account. This implies that the creditor remains sensi-
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tive to debtors’ feelings and concerns, an attitude particularly pronounced among 
MAG6 employees – probably because of both the fact that MAG6 is not a bank, as well 
as the small size of the cooperative. MAG employees and managers are thus able to 
build closer ties with cooperative’s members, and especially with borrowers. A MAG 
worker describe the importance of relational aspects as follows:  
 
We once had a project that went bankrupt, a social cooperative... also a project... af-
ter all, we are talking of 100,000 euros, a big project that we funded… there were five 
managers, who had been taken over by the banks... they were really... that is to say, did 
not let them go and they were taking them everything away. What did MAG in this case? 
[…] Not only did it not put more pressure on them, but it also gave them more oxygen, 
more liquidity so that they could get rid of the banks, it gave them time to recover, so 
that they could rebuild a capacity... a new income capacity, and gradually these people 
met their commitments all five together, no one run away. It is clear, however, that it 
demands a great ability to build close, trustful relationships among people. 
And how do you do it? How do you build this relational capacity of mutual trust? [ ... ] 
Well, how do we do? We build it in the course of time... how do you build a relation-
ship... well, I do not think there can be handbooks... I think that transparency […], trying 
to be as transparent as possible... how to say… […] giving welcome messages, that we 
can trust each other, especially me... I would say like a big transparency mechanism. 
[MAG6 worker, interview n. 2]. 
 
Likewise, another MAG6 worker stressed during an interview that taking care of re-
lationships with borrowers is a “strategic choice” of the cooperative: “strategic” means 
that this organization considers that, through caring relationships, even financial as-
pects benefit from it. However, the interviewee also added that MAG6 strives to focus 
its credit activity on solidarity and cooperative relationships mainly because it believes 
that only through the shaping of “different relationships” – that is, different from the 
individualistic and competitive dominant model – it is possible to produce social 
change. 
 
 
4. The mirror and the window: savers/borrowers relationships 
 
In order to create more cooperative relationships with borrowers, savers’ implica-
tions are also crucial. The saver and the borrower are linked to each other indirectly, 
through the intermediation of the bank or financial cooperative. Alternative finance 
organizations aim to evolve this particular relationship toward a different model (based 
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on cooperation rather than competition), just as a volunteer member of La Nef stated 
in an interview: 
 
Conventional banks are like mirrors, everyone sees only their own interests, savers 
want the maximum interest rate, borrowers the minimum, and La Nef is not... it's a win-
dow and it’s a glass… people see themselves... in fact... there is a true... well, true... there 
is a better relationship between individuals, there is a responsibility regarding money
28
 
[La Nef member, interview n. 1]. 
 
According to these words and, more generally, to the results of my fieldwork, it can 
be affirmed that the image of an “ideal” alternative finance customer includes the no-
tion of responsibility, consisting in bearing the consequences of the use banks make of 
one’s money. This element also refers to the recognition, on the savers’ side, that in-
terest rates paid to them29 will affect those charged on borrowers: in fact, MAG6, Ban-
ca Etica, and La Nef are forced to maintain a stable spread between active and passive 
interest rates to ensure the economic stability of their structures. 
In regards to the saver/borrower relationship within MAG6, we should mention the 
case of some funded projects which encountered difficulties. The workers of the coop-
erative supported these projects, for instance by raising funds; communicating about 
products sold by borrowers in order to encourage MAG members to buy them; and or-
ganizing training courses provided by persons who agree to earmark the money col-
lected from registration fees for the recovery of the debt. These practices aim at 
strengthening mutualistic bonds among the different actors involved in the coopera-
tive. They also helped develop a solidarity-based approach to borrowers, according to 
some cooperation principles that inspired the MAG6 experience. On the one hand, bor-
rowers cannot be held solely responsible for repayment difficulties (creditors are co-
responsible and, more generally, unexpected events can always arise); on the other 
hand, MAG6 managers and workers prefer to encourage the members of the coopera-
tive to think and act “together”, as a community that cannot be split up, especially 
when problems arise. Therefore, difficulties should be faced together. 
 
28 This is particularly true with respect to savers, who generally accept that the interest rates on their  
savings are established according to the principle consisting in avoiding too high interest rates on loans. In 
contrast, borrowers often try to negotiate lower interest rates. 
29
 Namely, interest rates they receive on their deposits. In MAG6, there are no saving products in the 
strictest sense of the word, as savers can only buy capital shares – this money is later used by MAG6  
workers for granting loans. Since December 2011, no interest rate has been paid to social capital shares. 
Concerning Banca Etica and La Nef, in contrast, some saving-products exist, but savers can also choose to 
donate part of or even all of their interest rate. 
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Some workers even question the very existence of two separate classes of social  
actors (namely, savers and borrowers): 
 
It bothers me a little that there is a difference between funders and funded members, 
that is, between those who manage to save money and, in contrast, those in need.  
Because... that is to say, it's as if I was creating two categories. However, in my imagina-
tion, there is a kind of... you're a member [of the cooperative], that’s all! You deposit 
what you can and at the end the other one takes it, but at the end it's not that... […] 
there is this... this distinction which, instead, in my opinion… it contradicts the concept of 
mutuality, because, in my opinion, the concept of mutuality is among peers, it's a circula-
tion [MAG6 worker, interview n. 4]. 
 
These words are in accordance with, and go beyond, the idea that it is not possible 
to draw a sharp line between debtors and creditors. These two supposedly “independ-
ent” actors – one owning temporarily unused money, the other needing it to realize a 
specific project – may actually be found to coincide within the same individual at dif-
ferent times of his life. Indeed, everyone can play both the role of saver and that of 
borrower (Dembinski 2008). 
Nevertheless, a more symmetrical saver/borrower relationship is not wished by all 
MAG6 members. During an assembly, some cooperative’s workers stressed that bor-
rowers tend to perceive themselves as debtors only, although they all hold some 
shares of social capital30, which at least “formally” would simultaneously confer both 
statuses on them: funders and funded members. Concerns, such as those expressed by 
the above-quoted MAG worker, are fueling debates and questioning the possibility of 
modifying the economic model of the cooperative. At the present, its incomes are 
mainly based on the interests charged on loans. However, a growing part of the work-
ing time (the main cost to be covered) does not relate to the credit activity carried out 
by MAG6. In contrast, workers spend more and more time on initiatives meant to 
strengthen mutualistic and solidarity relationships among the members of the cooper-
ative. These actions include, for instance, some training courses offered for free to co-
operative members and focused on topics such as: organizational analysis, household 
budget management, the relation to money and work; the experimentation of an ex-
change system complementary to the euro within a network of cooperatives and com-
panies belonging to the fields of organic agriculture, fair trade, and social services; the 
organization of members’ assemblies; the newsletter of the cooperative, and a mailing 
 
30
 Buying some shares of social capital is compulsory in order to get a loan from MAG6, the same rule  
applying to Banca Etica and La Nef as well. 
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list called “Bottega per nulla”31, which enables members to request and offer goods 
and services, by removing (or at least strongly limiting) the intermediation of money.  
Thus, according to a majority of MAG6 workers and managers, it is not fair to make 
the borrowers alone pay for these initiatives, which are still aimed at all the members 
of the cooperative, savers included. Proposals to face this problem refer to the possibil-
ity (still to be studied) of enabling borrowers to pay interest charged on loans through 
the sale of their goods and services to other MAG members, who would pay for them 
directly to the cooperative. Moreover, MAG6 workers are encouraging the members of 
the cooperative to contribute to cost recovery through donations (liberalità), by stress-
ing that many activities have been implemented, which concern not only borrowers, 
but all MAG6 members. The act of inviting members to participate in cost recovery 
through these donations is interpreted by some employees and managers not only as a 
contribution to initiatives set up by the cooperative – which are not limited solely to 
credit activity – but also as a payment for services that specifically benefits funding 
members. According to some MAG6 members, it would be fair if savers would pay for 
having their money used in a way consistent with their values, although this would 
mean a very demanding “sacrifice” for savers, who already accept not receiving any in-
terest on the money they deposit at MAG.  
These reflections have also been fueled by the recent experience of “MAG Firenze” 
(active as a financial intermediary since September 2013). The origins of MAG Firenze 
are linked to a “community” of people driven by the charismatic priest Alessandro San-
toro, having carried out a micro-credit business in some poor neighborhoods of Flor-
ence. This cooperative opened the discussion on the fairness of interests by banning 
them from both deposits and loans: its business model is based on members’ self-
taxation, meant to cover costs. The latter are particularly limited since MAG Firenze re-
lies on the volunteer work of some of its members. Despite cultural differences (the 
most active people in MAG Firenze remain strongly linked to the catholic religion, 
which is not the case for MAG6), this approach has encouraged debates and question-
ing of the MAG6 economic model, which currently draws most of its revenue from in-
terests charged on loans. 
In order to initiate a change within the cooperative, it is crucial to strengthen the re-
lations between savers and borrowers. One of the major limitations of this is the fact 
that only few (and sometimes no) borrowers participate in various opportunities of-
 
31
 Translation from Italian: “Small shop for nothing”. 
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fered to meet other MAG members, such as meetings or assemblies32. This point is 
raised by one of the cooperative’s workers in an interview: 
 
If I limit my ambition to collecting money and supporting projects in the field of alter-
native economy, MAG certainly reached this [goal], continues to do so, etc. But as re-
gards the other objective, however, which is the one I value the most and which is also 
MAG’s fundamental objective, I think however that it is not easy, because... The problem 
I see it is that people, and projects, are still too focused on their own projects, and there-
fore do not see this action of transferring money as instrumental in the fundamental ob-
jective that I just told you about
33
, but they focus on the fact that they need money, we 
give it to them, and that is already an achievement if they succeed […], if they manage to 
repay us with all the interests, therefore paying our structure as well, they already feel 
like... well... a very ambitious goal. […] If we look at our history with our funded projects, 
it is a bit like that, actually. When it goes well, we grant a loan, it is repaid and we keep a 
more or less positive relationship, but how this affected the deepest change, namely the 
fact of building different relationships… Personally, I have now some doubts about that 
[...]. 
You think that the problem lies in tools, that is to say, that finance is a tool poorly suit-
ed to achieve this goal, or that the problem lies in the fact that maybe not all people have 
this goal, because it is also a very difficult goal... 
[ ... ] I sometimes have the feeling that some of our projects have maybe the same 
goal as we have. If I think of the overview of our projects... but that they set it up there, 
outside, where they are, and this thing does not come into play, is not involved in the re-
lationship with us. [...] Because it's a little bit the issue... that is to say, I think the prob-
lem is how much a MAG6 member feels to be a MAG6 member, that is, it’s about mem-
bership. [ ... ] I think it's really an issue of membership to MAG6, that is: you are a mem-
ber of MAG6 because you deposit little savings, but then that one is not your... your... in 
the plurality of the identity formation, that piece, it is almost not there. 
And why, in your opinion? 
I don’t know! I don’t know why. 
I mean, it might have to do with the fact of being a financial cooperative, which is 
therefore seen, although much less worse, as banks are, and therefore: “The less I have to 
deal with it, the better I feel”? 
Yes, yes, no doubt. I’m telling you, even though we, however, as MAG6… as MAG6, we 
work a lot in the other direction, we give a lot of inputs and messages of another kind, I 
think that, instead, MAG6 is normally seen, self-perceived, and so... as a discourse on 
money and  
 
32
 The limited participation of borrowers in meetings and assemblies is a problem Banca Etica and La Nef 
also share.  
33
 The objective to create solidarity relationships. 
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therefore where I deposit it, where I take it from. That’s all. Although we work precisely 
in a completely different direction.  
[…] MAG is not seen as a political actor... 
In my opinion, yes, that’s the problem. 
And you think it has to do with money? 
With the tool of money, of course. 
You mean that it is hard to believe that money... 
Can change... certainly. Can be a tool for change. Although, as you know, besides fi-
nance, besides financial work, we have been doing a completely different work on collec-
tive imagination, for years, and not just for one day... […]. But on that aspect... I think we 
don’t manage to do this [MAG6 worker, interview n. 11]. 
 
The attempt at constructing more cooperative, and solidarity-based relationships 
between creditors and debtors, between savers and borrowers, seems to expose 
MAG6, Banca Etica, and La Nef to the well-known tensions relating to the various lev-
els of commitment, in particular concerning difficulties in making borrowers partici-
pate more in the activities carried out by the cooperative. But these organizations 
probably face also some specific constraints due to money, which remains a controver-
sial and ambiguous social object, even in the alternative finance sector. In particular, 
they must manage the “double nature” of their money: on the one hand, money they 
collect is “just a means” to reach solidarity aims (through the funding of projects which 
work in this direction); on the other hand, MAG6, Banca Etica and La Nef stress the fact 
that “solidarity-money” (i.e. money positively marked) should be regarded as an aim in 
itself, making the project of building an alternative finance a goal which deserves to be 
reached. A goal that should involve more social actors, both savers and borrowers. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This article focused on credit relations, something that MAG6, Banca Etica, and La 
Nef aim for 1) placing at the core of their activity and 2) transforming in a more coop-
erative and solidarity focused way. It is related to such works that emphasize the plu-
rality of normative references in the banking sector, besides profit maximization, and 
confirms the possibility of linking financial dimensions with extra-economic concerns. 
In particular, MAG6, Banca Etica, and La Nef attempt to establish forms of reciproci-
ty and mutuality in their relationships with borrowers, valuing the contributions that 
debtors are able to make to attempts at social transformation sought by the creditor 
organization, as well as to its internal profitability. With this in mind, alternative fi-
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nance organizations strive to attract savers engaging not only financially, but also “po-
litically;” who are ready to take responsibility for the consequences of the ways in 
which banks use their savings. In order to strengthen and transform the credi-
tor/debtor relationship, alternative finance organizations underline the fact that it is 
only through projects implemented by borrowers that the savers’ money acquires 
some positive meaning, thus qualitatively differentiating from money circulating in fi-
nancial markets, which are designed for profit generation in the short term.  
Nevertheless, the article also raises some critical points, as debtors tend to perceive 
themselves only as debtors, even if they are members of the bank or financial coopera-
tive and potential future creditors. A major challenge for MAG6, Banca Etica, and La 
Nef is thus the involvement of more funded members in the life of the organization to 
which they are indebted. 
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